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What constitutes ‘consent’ to extraction in the contemporary moment? How do we know when it has been 
freely given? How does it manifest in the world?  Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, when defending his 
government’s support of the controversial Transmountain Pipeline Expansion project over the past year 
has often included reference to the fact that more than 40 First Nations along the proposed route have 
signed “Mutual-Benefits Agreements” with the company. In the context of increasingly contested and 
politicized resource extraction projects, and reinvigorated and revitalized Indigenous legal orders, what 
should we make of the negotiation of private contractual agreements now routinely offered up as evidence 
of consent? 
In this essay, I consider the dynamics of ‘consent by contract’ or what others have called ‘negotiated 
justice’ (Szablowski 2010; Dezalay 1994) in the extractive sector by thinking through what the specific 
mechanism of contract accomplishes for the parties, and what governing by contract means for the 
interests of so-called non-parties. The ‘contractual turn’ of the past two decades has been documented 
extensively in many contexts (see for example Affolder 2012; Gaathi and Odumosu-Ayanu 2015; 
Zumbansen 2018), but here I focus on the rise of agreement-making between companies in the extractive 
sector and Indigenous communities in Canada. These agreements now come in the form of ‘impact-
benefit agreements’ (IBAs), ‘mutual-benefit agreements’, and ‘relationship-agreements’.  Here, I build on 
the critical scholarship examining these contracts by investigating whether there is any significance to the 
specific form in which the parties’ expectations are expressed. What does it mean to govern extraction 
through contract? 
The primary literature I draw on is contract law scholarship, including writing about contracts by legal 
scholars going back several decades to the critical legal studies movement, as well as relational contract 
scholarship, and the more recent writing examining the contractual turn in private transnational 
governance (see Cutler and Dietz, 2018). I hope to advance understandings of IBAs by applying these 
insights to a debate that has been dominated by critical geographers and political economists thus far. 
These interventions have generated crucial questions about representation, power, jurisdiction, and the 
interpellations between private and public that IBAs bring to the fore. There is also an important body of 
interdisciplinary scholarship investigating the social, political and economic conditions on the ground 
producing the context in which the contracts are negotiated, and their consequences, with significant 
contributions by socio-legal scholar David Szablowski (in the Latin American context) and public 
administration scholar Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh (in the settler colonies of Australia and Canada). Finally, 
there have been recent interventions by socio-legal scholars and practitioners examining the interplay 
between IBAs and settler law in relation to environmental protection, Aboriginal rights and Indigenous 
law (see for example Graben, Cameron and Morales 2019; Robertson 2019; Kamphuis 2017; Odumosu-
Ayanu 2018; McLean 2019).    
In terms of methodology, my reading of these literatures has been supplemented by a small number of key 
informant interviews with leading lawyers and consultants with extensive experience negotiating IBAs on 
behalf of First Nations in Canada.1 I also rely on the close reading of a few recent legal cases that have 
skirted around the margins of the deal-making dynamics, as well as documents disclosed through 
litigation and obtained through access to information requests in the context of contested extraction 
approvals affecting Indigenous lands.2  
Several points are immediately obvious on applying the insights of the contract law scholarship. First, and 
most basic, is that the form by which the parties’ expectations and obligations are expressed determines, 
at least formally, the remedies that will be available upon breach. Using contracts to govern extraction 
means that the ‘remedies’ the parties can count on when things go awry, will be, for the most part, limited 
to contract remedies as defined by the settler state’s common law. It goes without saying that under this 
regime, ‘non-parties’ have no remedies. Further, the remedies available upon breach are understood to 
determine how the parties approach whether they will decide to breach the agreement, or continue to 
invest in compliance. But in fact, what we observe on the ground is that the formal contract law remedies 
matter very little to the parties to IBAs, and are almost never invoked. Further, one of the so-called ‘non-
parties’ to these agreements, the settler state, is not only tangentially involved in the negotiations, it 
basically sets the terms. 
Second, the ‘contract realists’ in the critical legal studies movement observed that employing contract as 
the form of expressing the parties’ expectations has benefits for the parties with the most entrenched 
wealth. In other words, these scholars would have predicted that companies in the extractive sector stand 
to gain more from this contractual turn than the contracting Indigenous communities do. This makes 
sense, since the extractive companies tend to be ‘repeat players’ and as such become the ‘architects’ of 
the agreements in the sense that they set the rules, draft the protypes and shape the precedents, or at least 
their lawyers do (Affolder 2012). In a contractual regime, where the parties are  “free to choose whatever 
procedural rules and substantive laws they consider most suitable to govern” their relations (Cutler and 
Dietz, 2019: 4), those rules and laws would be expected to favour the companies. On the other hand, the 
contracting Indigenous communities may be right to judge that their position under the contractual regime 
is stronger than it is under the current public law regime provided by settler legislative frameworks and 
associated jurisprudence.  
It would be tempting to argue, then, that the turn to contracts is primarily a mode of risk mitigation 
employed by both parties to further their own economic interests in a context of pervasive uncertainty or 
inadequacy in the public law framework. This is indeed how the bulk of the scholarship has approached 
the interpenetration of the public and private in terms of IBAs – that the contracts are ‘filling the gaps’ of 
an inadequate regulatory regime and constitutional jurisprudence (see for example, McLean 2019; Fidler 
and Hitch, 2009).  On this understanding, while the use of contract benefits the companies more, reliance 
on the agreements can mitigate the risk of large losses for both parties. The companies avoid a high-
profile, reputation-harming dispute that lands them in court facing delays, and the communities avoid 
being saddled with the adverse impacts of a project that they derive no benefits whatsoever from. The 
contracts allow a hedging of bets, then, whereby the worst-case scenario is avoided for both parties, on a 
case-by-case basis. The First Nation parties may also be able to secure ‘enhanced environmental 
protection measures’ beyond what is required through settler state law (Robertson, 2019), but the 
prospects for Indigenous communities, collectively, to regain meaningful control and jurisdiction over 
extraction on their territories in the long term are undermined. 
I will argue that this conception paints the state into too passive a role, however. Who are the real parties 
to these contracts? The evidence reviewed here demonstrates clearly that the state is an active participant 
in shaping the contractual outcomes.  The contemporary practices of extraction contracting in fact conceal 
a multitude of trade-offs that are incurred as interests and values typically considered part of the public 
law sphere are moved into the private sphere through the deployment of contract (Affolder 2017). In other 
words, it is not the contractual form itself that entrenches private authority, but the way that state actors 
are holding space for these relations to do the governing.  The contracts are not proliferating as 
autonomous actors seek to fill a void in the public law regime, so much as the settler law is holding open 
the gap for the private law mechanisms to fill, because the contractual regime serves a purpose in the 
settler state’s interests.  
Specifically, the private contractual regime normalizes and facilitates the state’s provision of access to 
Indigenous lands for extractive capital. Thus, despite the fact that the emergence of IBAs might be 
considered an artifact of the crisis caused by Indigenous resistance to the settler state’s inclination 
towards accumulation by dispossession to begin with, the significance of the turn to contracts to govern 
extraction cannot now be understood without coming to view the deals as a part of the larger legal 
architecture of settler colonial capitalism that they have been absorbed into.  With the contracts satisfying 
the parties – at least to a limited extent in the short term -- there is less pressure on the state to resolve the 
obvious failure of the public law scheme to ensure that Indigenous peoples’ can exercise their territorial 
governing authority. Consent by contract, then, is a crucial node in the contemporary contest over 
jurisdiction between the settler state and the surging Indigenous resistance.  
In the first part of this paper, I outline the dynamics of ‘consent by contract’ that produce a market for 
consent in the contest over control of resource extraction on Indigenous lands, with a focus on Canada, 
although there are resonances with the dynamics in many other parts of the settler colonial world, if not 
broader. Consent by contract is a mode of governance that attempts to define the social, political, 
ecological and economic relations regarding the use of Indigenous lands solely through confidential 
bargaining and agreement-making between private extraction companies and First Nations, but in fact 
affords the state a key role in setting the terms. Documents filed in relation to the recent treaty case of 
Yahey v British Columbia (2018) expose the faulty logic inherent in the assumption that a Band’s 
conclusion of an IBA can be equated with the community’s consent to a project.   
In the second part, I review briefly some insights from contract law theory, reaching back to critical legal 
studies theorists of the 1980s and 1990s, to relational contract theorists, and to the contemporary theorists 
of transnational private governance. Documents disclosed in the recent judicial review decision of 
Eabametoong First Nation v. Landore (2017) demonstrate the high degree of penetration of state actors 
implementing public law processes, such as permitting for early exploration, into the negotiations 
between a First Nation and a junior mining company. Ultimately, it is not only that the settler state law 
sets the context for what can be negotiated between the parties, it is also that state actors actively facilitate 
the agreement-making, influence the parameters of the deal, and are invested in the outcomes.  Most 
significantly, the settler state then draws inferences adverse to Indigenous land interests from the very fact 
of these negotiations. 
Finally, in the third part I argue that the phenomenon of “extraction contracting”, even as it masquerades 
as a mode of private governance, in fact engages crucial public and constitutional governance questions. I 
conclude that it is not so much that the contracts are filling a gap in the inadequate public regulatory 
regime and associated jurisprudence (although the inadequacy is real), but that the public law regime is 
actively holding open the space for extraction contracting to fill because it insulates the settler law from 
demands for reform. If we take a clear look, based on these insights, we can see that the status quo flows 
from more-or-less deliberate decisions by state actors to rely on extraction contracting to determine the 
highly political outcomes to conflicts over land that are in the long-run detrimental to the Indigenous 
parties (with whom the state is in a fiduciary relationship). Why? I argue that it is to delay the inevitable 
break-down of the state’s jurisdictional authority on those lands, which will entail radical wealth re-
distribution from capital to Indigenous peoples. 
Part I: The (Rigged) ‘Market’ for Consent 
The dynamics of resource extraction in Canada are largely, and increasingly, shaped by the negotiation of 
a complex web of contractual agreements. These are not solely IBAs: they also include resource-revenue 
sharing agreements between tribal councils and provincial governments, as were recently concluded in 
Ontario, and ‘economic benefits agreements’ as in British Columbia; early exploration agreements and 
MOUs between First Nations and mining companies; framework agreements between communities and 
various governments and agencies over infrastructure or environmental assessment funding, among 
others.  Over the past several years, companies in the extractive sector have come to accept that this ‘deal-
making’ with Indigenous governments is a necessary part of the game – and in Canada, it is one that is 
considerably more predictable than attempting to comply with the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
consultation framework established by jurisprudence interpreting s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and 
hoping for the best. As many examples in this volume demonstrate, approved projects are not being built 
because of lengthy court proceedings, and even success in courts cannot guarantee that projects will 
proceed, because of the increasing capacity of Indigenous land defenders to disrupt extractive operations 
by asserting jurisdiction (see for example, Curran et al, Benton and Cochrane). The public law framework 
provided by settler law and jurisprudence, we are told, is not capable of achieving the ‘resource certainty’ 
that industry demands. Thus, negotiating a deal has become the first priority of companies interested in 
advancing a controversial extractive project, and – as much as they claim otherwise -- facilitating those 
deals has become a key task of state actors attempting to “re-legitimize extraction” (McCreary and 
Turner, 2018).  Signed contracts have come to ‘stand-in’ for expressions of consent in the contemporary 
moment.  
Even though it is very difficult to understand how the mere fact of a signed agreement could on its own 
constitute evidence of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) either as it is understood in international 
law under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“the Declaration”), or as it is 
understood in Indigenous legal traditions, we can observe that extraction is de facto authorized by the 
signing of a contract between industry and affected communities, in Canada as in other settler societies 
(Papillon and Rodon 2016).  That is, political actors in settler governments are putting forward the 
successful conclusion of deals as crucial legitimation for supporting contested resource projects, and 
companies are leveraging that ‘consent’ as a valued asset when marketing their projects to potential 
investors (Olynyk et al 2018). 
But how is this ‘authorization’ is granted in law?  Extraction is clearly governed on the ground by a range 
of overlapping and potentially conflicting norms and processes at the intersection of the relevant 
Indigenous, settler state, and international legal orders. As Pasternak (2017) has demonstrated, Canada is 
aptly characterized as an uneven patchwork of competing and overlapping claims to jurisdiction. Multiple 
ways of authorizing extraction include: the settler state’s common law – from its contractual regime, to its 
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence under s. 35, which details a duty to consult and accommodate in respect 
of Aboriginal and Treaty rights; settler state legislation, such as provincial resource laws governing oil 
and gas development, mining and land-use planning; international legal norms, such as the FPIC standard 
in the Declaration;  and most fundamentally, extraction is authorized, altered or rejected according to the 
Indigenous laws applicable to the territory in question (Scott & Boisselle, 2019). Acknowledging this 
plurality by drawing attention to contemporary enactments of Indigenous territorial authority challenges 
and complicates the exercise of presumed-to-be-exclusive state jurisdiction over natural resources 
(McCreary and Turner, 2018). 
The contractual regime, in the form of IBAs, emerged in the 1990s. The agreements have gone, according 
to one insider, “from being discretionary to being compulsory” over the past decade to the point that it is 
“unthinkable not to have one” (Webster 2019: at 28, 29). The basic deal is as follows: the Indigenous 
community receives a “package of measures” that typically includes promises to minimize or monitor 
environmental impacts and various economic benefits such as annual payments and/or local employment 
targets (O’Faircheallaigh, 2003:2; Expert Panel, 2017; Sosa & Keenan, 2001). In exchange, the 
community provides access to its lands, and offers support for, or acquiescence to, the project. Sometimes 
the First Nations are also expected to agree to a release of past infringements and future claims (Gilmour 
and Mellett, 2013; McLean 2019).  
Many scholars have raised concerns about the way the deals are struck. These include complex questions 
of representation, not only about whether members of affected communities are able to fully understand 
the proposed terms of a deal before having to register a view (Cameron and Levitan, 2014), but also about 
who has the authority to provide consent on behalf of a community. Typically, the authority to sign an 
IBA is presumed to lie with the Chief and Council through a Band Council Resolution, but this glosses 
over the fact that each Indigenous community will have its own political system structured by its unique 
legal order (Borrows, 2010). Recognizing this fact means acknowledging the potential applicability of 
multiple avenues for securing the community’s consent, including not only resolutions passed by Band 
Councils established under colonial legislation, but also hereditary processes derived from Indigenous 
legal orders (Graben, Cameron and Morales, 2019) – generating challenging questions about where 
authority lies, over which lands, and how community deliberation feeds into its exercise.  
There is also widespread concern that confidentiality clauses, which typically prohibit the communication 
of the contents of the contracts to anyone outside the negotiating process, are inhibiting “cross-
community comparisons… and holistic discussion of benefits and valuable experiences among 
communities…” (Caine and Krogman, 2010: 85). O’Faircheallaigh, who has conducted the largest 
empirical study of the negotiated outcomes from a number of IBAs in Canada and Australia, found that 
the ‘competitive element’ – the sense amongst communities that gains made by one First Nation would 
reduce the resources available for a neighboring First Nation – was exacerbated by the confidentiality 
provisions.  
Legitimate worries also exist in relation to the “support and cooperation” covenants that seek to prohibit 
“beneficiary populations” from opposing the company’s project in any regulatory proceedings or 
undertaking actions that could impede or delay the development. The First Nation is commonly expected 
to agree that it will not object to the issuance of any licenses, permits, authorisations or approvals in any 
regulatory proceedings. These provisions have been compared to “gag orders” in the sense that they 
purport to prevent community members from voicing concerns if new impacts come to light only after the 
development gets off the ground (Cameron and Levitan, 2014). Reported commitments made by First 
Nation parties range from “non-objection” to “express support”, with the IBA usually listing the kinds of 
‘oppositional activities’ that the First Nation is prohibited from undertaking (Bielawski 2003, 
O’Faircheillaigh 2016). Multiple negotiators I interviewed indicated that some companies seek to bind the 
First Nations to contractual terms that would require the Chief and Council to take positive steps to 
publicly defend the project against critiques levelled against it – at least in the context of official 
regulatory proceedings, if not in the general public domain. As O’Faircheallaigh sees it, the First Nation 
parties are accepting constraints on their ability to exercise their rights – whether inherent rights, 
constitutional rights or rights granted though settler state legislation, in exchange for very modest benefits 
that may have also been possible without the IBA (2016:166).  
Finally, there are serious concerns about the equitable distribution of both benefits and potential harms. 
This is as true within communities as it is between them, with gender being a crucial consideration 
(Graben, Cameron and Morales, 2019; Fidler and Hitch 2007; Wiebe and Konsmo, 2014). Jobs, training 
and economic benefits of extraction typically benefit men in the communities, while major extractive 
projects, through the introduction of “man camps” and the opening up of remote areas with new 
infrastructure, pose profound risks to Indigenous women and girls (Women’s Earth Alliance and 
NYSHN, 2016). The recently-released Final Inquiry Report into Missing and Murdered Indigenous 
Women and Girls (2019) in Canada states explicitly that governments must “do a more thorough job of 
considering the safety of Indigenous women and children when making decisions about resource 
extraction on or near Indigenous territories” (at 584). 
On one view of IBAs, Indigenous communities are exercising jurisdictional autonomy as self-determining 
nations when they negotiate directly with industry towards goals of economic self-reliance. Critics, on the 
other hand, say that the agreements, because they are “one-offs”, confidential, and have no minimum 
requirements (Mining Watch Canada, 2011), undermine the practical ability of First Nations to determine 
desired land uses for themselves and leave them to “self-determine” within the very narrow confines of 
extractive capitalism (Dempsey, Gould and Sundberg, 2011) and a wage economy. But in the end, it is 
clear that the opportunity to negotiate a deal represents a chance for a community to “not only gain 
economically…but also affect the trajectory and scale of development” (Caine and Krogman 2010, 77) – 
an outcome that is hard to otherwise come by through the settler state’s public law framework.  
And there is the rub: the fundamental problem is that the Indigenous communities whose lands are 
threatened by extractive projects are not recognized as holding the jurisdiction to decide whether or not 
permits should be granted in the first place. Strictly considering the current state of doctrine in settler law 
today, notwithstanding the adoption of the UN Declaration, the idea of FPIC – and conversely, the 
possibility that ‘no’ could mean ‘no’ – is not yet a feature of the public law regime in Canada (Peerla 
2012; Hamilton 2019), or other jurisdictions (Szablowski 2010). Whereas the Declaration, according to 
UN Special Rapporteur James Anaya (2014), is rooted in the affirmation of the right of Indigenous 
peoples, as self-determining peoples, to have control over their lands and their futures, the Canadian state 
fears that implementing this vision would amount to giving Indigenous peoples a “veto” over resource 
development (Imai, 2017; Papillon and Rodon 2017). That is because the right of Indigenous consent to 
development on their traditional lands is seen as threatening to the basic foundational notion of 
‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’ for states (Szablowski 2010). 
The primary jurisprudential tool that settler courts in Canada use to decide these disputes is the duty to 
consult and accommodate – a spectrum of consultation and accommodation rights developed by the 
settler courts to manage areas on which Aboriginal and Treaty rights have been claimed or recognized. 
And under this jurisprudence, even on the end of that spectrum where title or treaty rights provide the 
most scope for First Nations to consent to or refuse projects, those rights remain subject to the Crown’s 
“justifiable infringement” (Scott & Boisselle, 2019; Imai, 2017). The situation was summed up well by 
Chief Allan Adam of Athabascan Chipewyan First Nation, whose community is situated near the Alberta 
tar sands, in September 2018. Having long been a central critic of the devastating impacts of extractive 
projects in the territory, he finally signed an IBA with mining giant Teck Resources, stating:  
“We’ve been fighting industry for how long? And we’ve spent well over $1-million in court fees 
with nothing tangible in return…So what am I supposed to do?...I don’t want to do this. I didn’t 
want to make this decision but I had no choice. I had to make sure ..our people are going to 
benefit from it for the future” (McCarthy, 2017). 
As Imai says, “[t]he problem with the consult standard is that the community feels powerless because 
they are powerless. It is difficult for people to trust a process of discussion when they know that no matter 
what happens, the final decision is not in their hands” (Imai, at 385-386). In other words, negotiations 
towards IBAs are always “premised on the assumption that the project will be approved” (Papillon and 
Rodon 2017: 13). It is merely a matter of deciding on the “compensation package [that will be provided] 
in exchange for consent” (Ibid; see also Weitzner, 2006). We are asked to believe that consent has a price, 
and that it can be bought and sold in a private market. 
Is a signed IBA evidence of a community’s consent? 
Yahey v British Columbia concerns a larger Treaty rights claim by the Blueberry River First Nation; it is 
part of the wave of cases now coming forward under the banner of a “meaningful right to harvest” (Imai, 
2017). The Band is arguing that the cumulative impact of state permitting processes for industrial uses has 
transformed the landscape to such as extent that it is undermining the community members’ abilities to 
use their traditional territory for hunting and fishing as guaranteed in Treaty 8.3 In this specific ruling, 
however, the court answers the state request for disclosure of any IBAs that Blueberry River had signed 
with project proponents. British Columbia argued that the IBAs would demonstrate the Band’s consent to 
the projects, and that the Band had already been compensated for any violation of their Treaty rights. In 
documents filed in the ongoing litigation, Blueberry River objects, arguing that “since the matter was out 
of their hands, signing an impact benefits agreement or otherwise participating in industrial development 
cannot be viewed as acquiescing in the diminution of their treaty rights and thus is not relevant to the 
Province’s defence” (Aelene Guingcango, Affidavit of April 11 2018: 4). In fact, the Band stated, it had 
formally objected at the approvals stage to two gas transmission projects and only entered into 
agreements with the companies “after the Province had approved those projects over the plaintiffs’ 
objections” (Merli de Guzman, Affidavit of December 9 2017: 2-3).  
In the case of one of the projects, Blueberry River details how it wrote to the Ministers responsible for the 
project requesting that they deny the approval, and asking the Crown to engage the Band to discuss 
threats to their treaty rights, but the request was not responded to. The Band offers the evidence to show 
that the approval was granted shortly after and almost 11 months passed before the IBA was entered into. 
The Band argues that these approvals demonstrate that the environmental assessment process is flawed 
and that the Crown failed to fulfill its duty to consult accommodate the Band’s concerns about negative 
effects on treaty rights and the environment (Ibid. 2-3). 
These negotiations occurring as part of the Blueberry River litigation demonstrate explicit state attempts 
to re-legitimate extractive developments, even when they have been approved over the explicit objections 
of affected Indigenous peoples. One lawyer I interviewed stated in respect of IBAs like these that, “at 
best, you are negotiating over minor environmental mitigation measures…on a territory that really cannot 
bear any more projects”.  Until communities actually have the power to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to extractive 
activities on their ancestral homelands, it is impossible to conclude that an IBA can constitute evidence of 
meaningful ‘consent’ to a project.  There is a structural power imbalance in place, stemming “from the 
ability of companies to decide which communities they will negotiate with, to end negotiations, and more 
generally to get projects approved and proceed without IBAs” (St-Laurent and Le Billion at 8).  
Contract as Risk Management 
From this we could conclude that an IBA is simply extra insurance for companies – “IBAs have proven to 
be a useful tool for industrial proponents to manage risk”, according to three corporate lawyers writing 
recently in Lexpert magazine (Olynyk, Bergner and Shipley, 2018/2019).  Hania (2019) states that an IBA 
is a “mechanism that stabilizes the risk inherent in [an extractive] project” (539).  Similarly, a negotiator 
that I interviewed agreed that “political risk is a major motivator” for companies in terms of bringing 
them to the table.4  And risk management is an aim of communities as well. Because settler law does not 
put First Nations in a position to envision their own projects for the territory, IBAs are often perceived as 
the “best (and often last) option for influencing the flow of resources back to the community” (Caine and 
Krogman at 85), meaning that other parties’ development priorities are inevitably thrust on First Nations 
to consider.  But communities do have their own priorities, often with built-in notions of environmental 
sustainability, intergenerational justice and visions for land-based economies and livelihoods not 
compatible with a wage economy (Simpson, 2016).  
Unfortunately, as the literature shows however, IBAs cannot be relied on for generating “future benefit 
streams” (Caine and Krogman 2010:78; O’Faircheallaigh 2016) nor for enacting alternative visions of 
sustainable economic development (Cameron and Levitan, 2014).  This failure derives, at least in part, 
from the fact that IBAs make First Nations more dependent on revenues generated through extractivism 
in order to meet community members’ basic fiscal needs. Extractivism is a mode of accumulation that is 
non-reciprocal and oriented to the short-term, generating profits for distant owners and very little in the 
way of benefits for local people (Veltmeyer, 2013; Acuña, 2015).  This creates a situation where 
communities who have signed IBAs, once all the resources are extracted, are left with no trace of the 
promised wealth and prosperity, but with the lasting legacy of a comprised homeland.  As political 
ecologists have demonstrated, even new forms of ‘progressive extractivism’ that incorporate benefit 
sharing with Indigenous communities – a function of the contractual turn -- tend to push communities 
towards standard forms of economic development and a wage economy (Gudynas, 2009). This is because 
they depend on growth, an ongoing and linear process of material ‘progress’, forcing communities to 
accept a re-definition of relations with land into capitalist terms of revenues, assets and individual gain 
(Ibid; Veltmeyer and Bowles 2014).  
To conclude this part, I argue that we cannot simply see the turn to contracts as an expression of 
autonomy or self-determination without investigating the background context for the negotiations, 
including the underlying power relations. And here it is clear that the backdrop set by the settler 
jurisprudence takes all of the leverage away from the First Nations. As Szablowski (2010) says, the 
formal regulatory regime forms the ‘skeleton’ that supports and structures the engagement process, 
providing valuable resources and bargaining entitlements to the parties. In this way, the settler law’s 
allocation of legal rights and duties comes to shape the private ordering. The most crucial of these 
allocations is that the Crown claims underlying title to, and jurisdiction over, all of the lands within the 
settler state’s borders. 
Contracts clearly include and embed not only private law norms, but state law norms as well. The parties 
are “bargaining in the shadow” of the public law. As Wai (2008) says, while contractual relations are 
assumed to be private consensual relations, state law is always ordering the interactions of the parties. 
But, it is not only that private agreements incorporate and embed regulatory standards and assumptions 
derived from public law, as I have shown in this part, but that those agreements implicate a broad range of 
public interests and interests of so-called ‘non-parties’, and that the state is actively engaged in shaping 
the contractual outcomes, as I will demonstrate next. 
 
Part II: Relational Contracts, and their Remedies  
“[M]uch of contract theory depends on a picture of consensual, uncoerced transactions”  
(Macauley 2015: 110). 
American legal scholar Stewart Macauley spent a career breaking down the formal assumptions of 
contract doctrine to demonstrate how the real-world conditions of contracting differed sharply from the 
assumptions in the jurisprudence. Amongst the assumptions he drew into question: that parties carefully 
draft contracts on equal terms, which they fully understand and agree to (2003). More often, Macauley 
argued, the written contract is incongruent with the actual expectations of the parties. As Treaty people, 
we should by now be familiar with this idea. One of the key reasons for the disparity, according to 
Macauley, is that those who negotiate the deal are not the ones who draft it, and not the ones who have to 
perform it.  But as he demonstrates, “proving what the real deal was can be very costly…[as] experts are 
not free” (44) (also an apt remark in the context of both IBAs and Treaty). 
Macauley was writing alongside Ian Macneil, another American legal scholar whose work launched the 
field of “relational contract theory” with the observation that how parties behave in their contractual 
relations is less about the contract terms and more about how they hope and expect to relate to each other 
in the future. This scholarship takes for granted that there are many factors operating outside of the “four 
corners of the contract” that shape the relations between the parties, and the decisions they make in 
relation to its breach (Macauley 2015).  
In fact, a point made in early contract law scholarship is that the remedies available for breach of contract 
essentially determine the “risk-sharing” as between the parties (Polinski, 1981). The remedy available 
against a breaching party will influence a party’s decision as to whether they will breach, or invest in 
compliance. In fact, the purpose of providing “sanctions” for promises broken, according to the classical 
liberal contract law theory Macneil critiqued, is to protect the reliance on promises and to prevent unjust 
enrichment (Macneil 1962).  Unjust enrichment, or the law of restitution, is based on the ‘moral principle’ 
that the status quo should be restored between the parties where one's loss has unjustifiably become the 
other's gain (Burrows, 2011).   
What is “unjust enrichment” in the context of extraction contracting? The company would be unjustly 
enriched, according to contract law doctrine, if the company receives the social license, permits, or the 
“acquiescence” of the community, but the First Nation does not receive the promised benefits. And the 
reverse: the First Nation would be unjustly enriched if it received benefits under the agreement 
(payments, as an example) but withheld or withdrew its support or took other measures to undermine the 
company’s social license, asset value etc.  The order in which the parties deliver their “goods”, then, 
clearly matters in the real world of extraction contracting. In the context of most IBA negotiations, the 
company benefits first and performs later, ie. the First Nation agrees to acquiesce or stay silent through 
regulatory proceedings (if not stand on a stage and shake hands in front of cameras), and the cheques 
begin rolling in later. On the flip side, the First Nation performs/delivers first and benefits later. In fact, 
cheques for annual payments are easily interrupted, but regulatory approvals tend to be much more 
difficult to reverse or rescind. So, the stock response that lawyers give when asked about a community’s 
remedies under IBAs in the case of a company’s breach of obligations – that a community can always 
withdraw its support -- seems out of touch with the reality of when and how leverage can be used on the 
ground. Several of the negotiators I interviewed agreed that the First Nation’s points of leverage depend 
heavily on the timing of the regulatory approvals. In fact, one negotiator acknowledged that a reason why 
the ‘expressions of support’ provisions of an IBA are typically considered more ‘enforceable’ than most, 
is that those expressions are expected prior in time to the performance of the companies obligations. 
Knowing something about contract remedies – the recourse that is available to each party under the law in 
the case of breach – and how they can access it, then, is part of understanding the implications of the turn 
to contract to govern these relationships. The most important thing to know is that the general rule is 
money damages. “Contract law is generally understood to require no more of a person who breaches a 
contract than to give the injured party the ‘benefit of the bargain’” (Thel and Siegelman 1181). As long as 
the company can compensate for the breach (in monetary terms), it is, according to the settler law of 
contract, free to break its promises. This rule has obvious deficiencies for the Indigenous parties for 
whom many of the values sought to be protected through the IBA, such as a sacred river system, 
ecological integrity, or culturally significant sites, are not compensable with money damages. 
The other general rule is that the parties may determine and set out in the agreement how they wish to 
handle disputes. Typically, this includes mediation provisions, and where mediation fails to resolve the 
issue, the disputes are referred to an arbitrator under the settler state’s commercial arbitration legislation. 
The arbitrator’s decision is binding on the parties, and the relevant provisions typically also stipulate that 
the arbitration process, and any proceedings in connection with it, will remain confidential. There is some 
indication that IBAs may also contain provisions that contemplate recourse to settler courts for ‘interim 
judicial relief in the nature of an injunction or other equitable relief’ pending arbitration (Pinehouse 
Agreement, 2012, art.7). However, the lack of transparency around the agreements means that scholarly 
understanding of the extent to which IBAs might reach arbitral tribunals, or mediation, is lacking 
(McLean 2019; Robertson, 2015). “The arbitration universe is…a closed world; it gives no voice to those 
parties who are external to the contractual order” (Perez, 2016:105).  
Scholarship predicts that private parties may make use of formal contracts to structure their relationships 
even when they have no intention of using formal contract enforcement mechanisms (Hadfield and 
Bozovic, 2016). That is, parties in relational contracts may be content to rely on other tools like 
‘reputation’ to induce compliance. Here, the central purpose of formal contracting then, is “to coordinate 
beliefs about what constitutes a breach of a highly ambiguous set of obligations” (Ibid: 982). Speaking of 
a ‘highly ambiguous set of obligations’, consider how negotiators are said to approach the question of the 
“no-protest” clauses. As one interviewee stated, “lawyers fight at length about this point”, as they try to 
shape the precise contract language that will put into words exactly “how …consent [is] rendered, and 
how can it be taken away”. The negotiators I interviewed confirmed that companies will seek “life-of-the-
project consent”, “irrevocable consent”, and “blank cheque consent” as well as “no-protest clauses” in 
which they attempt to “bind everyone” [in the community], and try to get the Band “to promise there will 
be no trouble…”.  More than one negotiator I interviewed stated that they advise Bands not to concede to 
these demands, with one explaining that “you can never bind the members, the youth, the hereditary 
leaders… If they decide to blockade the road, the leadership is at a loss – all they can do is not sanction 
it”. Another interviewee admitted, however, that the First Nation is often forced to agree to terms that 
obligate the Chief and Council to take “positive steps to deter protestors or to make public statements 
denouncing their actions”.5  
Beginning with the critical legal studies movement and continuing to today, scholars have demonstrated 
how the terms of contracts are almost always imposed by the stronger, better-resourced repeat players 
(Galanter, 1981; Macauley 2003; and see recently Cutler and Dietz, 2017). O’Faircheallaigh’s research 
confirms that this dynamic is present with respect to IBAs as well: companies use their substantial 
experience negotiating with Indigenous peoples to gain advantageous contract terms (2016). But while 
size, power and experience matter in negotiations, as Affolder makes clear, there is also a “less visible 
and pernicious privileging that occurs through contractual norm-setting” (216).  
A contract is supposed to be the “quintessential expression of a liberal theory of society” (Zumbansen 
2018:3). It is meant to create a binding basis for a reciprocal exchange of commitments (Ibid.) That is, 
contract law’s role has always been one of facilitating rather than putting conditions around what may be 
‘autonomously’ agreed to (Affolder 2017:217). But as O’Faircheallaigh demonstrates by pointing to the 
widespread use of ‘boilerplate’ or template agreements, indications are that there really is very little 
bargaining going on: “The company determine[s] exactly what it [i]s prepared to agree to, enshrine[s] this 
in the template agreement, and move[s] from that position only when absolutely necessary” (2016: 168). 
Further as Affolder has argued, “Contract lawyers are well aware that it is in the boilerplate, in the 
creation of contractual norms, forms and defaults, that power gets divided and that winners and losers are 
made” (Affolder 2017, 215).  Even more crucial in this context is the degree to which non-parties - state 
actors – seem to set the terms for the ‘negotiation’. Consider the following case study based on a recent 
judicial review application challenging the issuance of an early exploration permit in Ontario’s far north6: 
Eabametoong v Landore …(and Ontario) 
Eabametoong First Nation (EFN) is a remote Anishinabe community situated in Treaty 9 territory.  A 
junior mining company, Landore Resources, applied for an exploratory drilling permit in the area of two 
lakes that are used year-round by several Eabametoong families for sustenance, cultural, and spiritual 
purposes according to the applicable Indigenous stewardship laws governing family clans (Atlookan, 
2016).  Over a period of several years, the community leaders and company officials engaged in back-
and-forth communications about EFN’s wish to strike a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to 
formalize the parties’ expectations on the basis of good faith and respect, and their desire to meet in 
person with the company leadership to discuss affected clans’ concerns. Officials in Ontario’s Ministry of 
Northern Development and Mines (the Ministry) were involved at various stages, attempting to facilitate 
meetings, taking notes of community concerns and discussing them with the company. At one point, 
Ministry officials urged Landore to get in touch with EFN leaders, saying that the permit would not be 
issued until the community’s concerns were met through the negotiation of an MOU (Applicant’s factum 
at 7). The company presented EFN with a boilerplate agreement, but the community continued to press 
for various measures specific to their concerns. This exasperated the company, who stated that it had 
“successfully used this MOU template with [another Band]…and suggested to EFN to contact [their 
Chief]” if they needed further convincing (Landore’s factum, 2016). 
Later, when the issue took on a new urgency for Landore as they were negotiating to sell their assets to 
Barrick Gold, the Ministry and Landore had a private face-to-face meeting without informing 
Eabametoong leaders. Landore advised the Director that it needed the permit to be approved quickly. 
There is some evidence that the Ministry pressed the company to address some of the community’s key 
demands at this meeting – including the decommissioning of the company’s previous camp in the 
territory (Applicant’s Factum at 7). Very soon after, the Ministry wrote to EFN informing the leaders that 
a decision would be made about the permit in a matter of days, and requesting any information the 
community wished to provide about adverse impacts. Eabametoong requested a meeting with Landore, 
who refused. EFN leaders subsequently wrote to the Ministry expressing concerns about both the project 
and the process. The Ministry responded with possible terms and conditions for permit approval and 
requested a swift response. EFN provided a letter from the community’s lawyer setting out their 
objections in more detail, but the Ministry went ahead and issued the permit without replying to EFN.  
On judicial review, the Court overturned the approval. It held that since the Crown had ‘delegated’ parts 
of its duty to Landore, the company’s actions and the reasonable expectations they created by making 
promises to EFN were relevant to whether the duty to consult and accommodate was met. The Court 
stressed that the duty to consult does not give Eabametoong the right to unilaterally insist that a MOU be 
in place before the permit can be granted, or that any other process take place, but that because Landore 
had agreed to both the MOU and the community meeting, there was a responsibility to follow through, or 
at least offer Eabametoong an explanation. What the Court took issue with in this case was the sense that 
the purpose of the process switched from mutual understanding to facilitating approval in response to 
commercial timelines, holding that the Crown may not conclude a consultation process in consideration 
of external timing pressures when there are outstanding issues to be discussed. 
What is most interesting in examining this case is that the Ministry took the position that EFN’s insistence 
on an MOU was ‘contrary to legal requirements and Ministry policy’, but the Ministry did not 
communicate this to Eabametoong during the negotiations, instead seeming to attempt to facilitate 
negotiation towards an MOU itself. The policy in question is the Ministry’s operational policy on 
“Consultation and arrangements with Aboriginal communities at early exploration” (MNDM, 2012). It 
states:     
“Early exploration proponents and Aboriginal communities should not underestimate the 
importance of their role in the process. While MNDM’s specific expectations are outlined in Part 
II of this Policy, early efforts to engage with one another, beyond the minimum processes 
required pursuant to the Mining Act and this Policy, will lead to more effective and timely results 
later. Building relationships and goodwill may lead to mutual commitments and arrangements 
and provide the certainty and stability for a project that permitting processes alone cannot 
achieve. Aboriginal communities and industry proponents must be willing to work constructively 
to understand one another’s interests and perspectives and to find practical ways of addressing 
concerns and realizing opportunities that mineral exploration may have to offer” (at 2, my 
emphasis). 
This amounts not only to a state endorsement of the ‘opportunities’ that mining presents for communities, 
but also an admission that contracting can lead to outcomes that permitting cannot provide. Later, the 
policy re-iterates that “proponents are strongly encouraged to make efforts to reach arrangements with 
communities in advance of submitting an application” and states that “arrangements that address concerns 
of Aboriginal communities related to consultation and mitigation will enable more timely decision-
making by MNDM” (at 8).  The Ministry further encourages proponents to support First Nations’ 
capacity to engage in negotiations by directly re-imbursing their expenses or paying for technical 
services, and promises that “MNDM will support these contributions by ensuring they are eligible 
expenses for assessment credit under the Mining Act” (9). The MNDM states that proponents should 
strive to include various commitments in their “arrangements” with communities, such as seasonal 
modifications to work schedules or environmental monitoring, and states that should no agreement be 
possible, the Ministry may include such measures as conditions on the permit (9). 
The MNDM even articulates specific content suggestions for the contracts, stating that the arrangements 
“should, ideally, reflect the following principles: be proportional to the nature, scale and duration of the 
project and its potential impacts; not place an excessive burden on the proponent or undermine the 
feasibility of the project; and be sufficiently transparent to satisfy MNDM’s reporting requirements while 
also helping to manage expectations and bring a level of certainty and consistency to the field” (11).  
Finally, the province also funds a ‘Community Consultation Liaison Officer’, a member of the 
community’s Band office whose job description is to support the community’s capacity to engage with 
the Ministry and industry regarding mineral exploration. 
As Cutler (2018) argues, private capital will always seek to embed risks in the public domain – here, we 
can see that it is not so much the contract remedies themselves that determine the risk-sharing amongst 
the parties, but the structure of the public law regime. Because the duty to consult and accommodate lies 
formally on the state, companies are free to engage as they wish, exploring whether there are any gains to 
be made from contracting, but never with a down-side risk that it could affect their entitlements to the 
permit. It is the state that is ultimately on the hook when the First Nation and company parties fail to 
come to terms. And of the course the community – as in this case, if they had not launched the litigation, 
they would have been saddled with the negative effects of the new drilling, as well as the still-not-
decommissioned prior work camp.  
What this case demonstrates is the high degree of penetration of state actors implementing public law 
processes, such as permitting for early exploration, into the negotiations towards ostensibly ‘private’ 
agreements. State actors deliberately delegate certain aspects of the ‘consultation’ to the compnaie, but 
they do not completely “check out” as one negotiator put it. This results in the situation in which First 
Nations find themselves engaging in discussions with the Crown in which they take hard-line positions so 
as to raise the bar of what might be expected of the company in their separate, ‘private’ negotiations 
towards an IBA.  Ultimately, it is not only that the settler state law shapes the context and contours of 
what can be negotiated between the parties, it is almost to the point that the state actors effectively 
determine the terms, and then – as we saw in the Yahey case – the settler state seeks to draw inferences 
adverse to Indigenous land interests from the very fact of the deals. As relational contract theory would 
predict, the agreements themselves are embedded in a web of relations, with the structure of the web 
determined by the settler state’s public law.  The legal architecture into which any ‘arrangements’ may fit 
has been systematically structured by the settler state to favour the companies’ access to Indigenous lands 
for extraction. 
 
Part III: Extraction Contracting: How ‘Private’ Agreements Serve the Settler State  
What is the precise role of the state in the negotiation of IBAs? There is by no means agreement in the 
literature as to how to characterize the role state governments are playing. Hall (2012) argues that 
governments are “not neutral arbitrators” in these circumstances; others have observed that industry and 
government seem to be aligning themselves; or that “government is relegated to an external observational 
role” (Caine and Krogman 2010 at 77). Fidler and Hitch (2009) say that the Crown ‘underpins’ the 
agreements (6). A Library of Parliament publication on IBAs from 2014 states that “[w]ith a few 
exceptions, governments are not directly involved in the development or negotiation of these bilateral 
arrangements” (Kielland, 2015). Similarly, Cameron and Levitan (2014) characterize the striking of the 
deals as a “privatization of the federal duty to consult Indigenous peoples about resource development” 
(25) and posit that “the longstanding interest of the state in promoting northern resource development is 
better achieved by not being directly and formally involved…except, importantly, at the level of 
upholding contract law” (27). The more recent evidence, I suggest, tends towards a much more active role 
for state actors in the contractual regime. 
Although the use of IBAs remains formally ‘elective’ (however necessary it is on the ground), extraction 
contracting is woven into various public processes, not the least of which is permitting and approvals. To 
use the most obvious example, that of environmental assessment, IBAs often purport to bind parties to 
certain predetermined positions on the precise issues that are being adjudicated by public regulators. 
Further, if ‘private law’ is meant to denote arrangements between two private contracting parties, it is 
important to remember that IBAs are actually negotiated with Indigenous governing authorities, lending 
them a public character in addition to the fact that they are backed by the state enforcement of settler 
contract law and its specific remedies, or so we often assume.  The state’s regulatory proceedings also 
layer deadlines into the negotiating process, as do commercial imperatives (as was observed with Landore 
and EFN), which add pressure to already high-stakes situations. The formal legal authority of public 
officials is seen in stark contrast to the actual power and authority exercised by private actors, in relation 
to permitting as a classic case.  Finally, there is continuing application of the settler law of injunctions, 
which further structures, in the state’s interests, the ‘remedies’ available to the parties to an IBA (Ceric, 
this volume). The settler law of injunctions mobilizes the threat of state violence through police or 
military force to bolster the state’s claims to exclusive territorial authority. It is clear that there is no way 
to conceive of these agreements as wholly private. The state is intimately involved -- arguably a party to 
the deal. 
In this section, I argue that the phenomenon of “extraction contracting”, even as it masquerades as a mode 
of private governance, in fact engages crucial public and constitutional governance questions. I conclude 
that it is not so much that the contracts are filling a gap in the inadequate public regulatory regime and 
associated jurisprudence (although the inadequacy is real), but that the public law regime is actively 
holding open the space for extraction contracting to fill because it insulates the settler law from demands 
for reform. If we take a clear look, based on these insights, we can see that the status quo flows from 
more-or-less deliberate decisions by state actors to rely on extraction contracting to determine the highly 
political outcomes to conflicts over land that are in the long-run detrimental to the Indigenous parties. 
This is a struggle for the control of lands and resources, and the settler state is invested in delaying the 
inevitable break-down of its jurisdictional authority on those lands, which will entail major wealth re-
distribution from capital to Indigenous peoples. 
lex extractionis 
Many of the questions driving my inquiries here are common to the contemporary scholarly literature on 
transnational private governance, such as: What are the mechanisms through which private authority 
gains legitimacy? And, “[h]ow have specific private modes of governance gained standing as (de facto) 
public authority”? (Hartmann and Kjaer 2018: 4). Extraction in Canada is obviously shaped by dynamics 
beyond state borders, and the literature on transnational law -- attentive as it is to legal pluralism and non-
state actors -- is instructive even as I believe there is a sui generis character to the way that consent by 
contract has emerged in Canada. 
Perhaps IBAs are doing just what they are intended to do: a contract is a “device …for the separation of 
social relations from state law” (Collins, 1999: 123).  But why, how, and who does it benefit? IBAs are 
certainly not unique – there is a semi-political or constitutional character to other types of major 
contractual regimes as well (Perez, 2016). A central preoccupation of scholars of transnational private 
governance is the question of what justifies the exemption of these transactions, essentially constitutional 
in character, from public law’s grasp? The roots of a “sharp distinction between the private and public 
orders”, according to Perez (2016), lies within the lex mercatoria, a body of accepted trading principles 
used by merchants across early trading routes. “The purpose of the lex mercatoria was understood, 
historically, as protecting business expectations; the primary task of the lex mercatoria was to render 
business relations more calculable” (96). Here, in extraction contracting, we can discern a similar 
business purpose, but we also observe the way that ‘lex extractionis’ (if I may) imposes the costs of 
contested projects onto what these scholars might call the “extra-contractual community”. Extraction 
encroaches deeply into the social and ecological relations on the territories on which it takes place: “[t]his 
embeddedness is highly incongruent with the image of an isolated 'business relation' (Perez 2016: 98). 
Claire Cutler, describing the public/private distinction, argues that it is fundamental to liberal theory to 
ensure that the public realm “constitutes a contested political space subject to regulation by legitimate 
political authorities” in contrast to the private sphere which is “understood to be an apolitical realm of 
individual freedom and autonomy, outside the scope of legitimate political regulation” and primarily 
dealing with economic activity between rational actors of equal bargaining power (2018: 70). The task of 
separating public from private, she argues, rests on differentiating economics from politics, which is  
an analytical distinction that has little empirical validity. The separation of the political and the 
economic is an analytical and ideological separation engendered by the capitalist mode of 
production that functions to depoliticize the fundamentally distributional and political nature of 
economic activity. This separation masks the underlying structural connection between the two 
spheres and the power imbalances that inhere in capitalist economic and social relations (71). 
Further, and most pertinent here, is Cutler’s assertion that “the assumption of the apolitical nature of 
private/economic exchanges ignores the more generalized and public implications of these exchanges. In 
essence, the analytical distinction does not bear out in the lived experiences of people who are impacted 
by private agreements” (71).  In the case of IBAs, it is plainly obvious that many interests are engaged in 
the periphery of these contracts that are conspicuously left out of the deal. These include the interests of a 
broader public in environmental sustainability, climate stability, biodiversity protection, conservation of 
intact ecosystems; the pressing questions of Indigenous governing authority, inherent jurisdiction and the 
overall impact of projects on Treaty rights, not just those of the contracting parties but neighboring 
nations.  Something else traded away seems to be the leverage of the communities when they bargain 
collectively, including the ability to secure strategic, regional and long-term interests and visions 
emerging from their own Indigenous social, political and legal orders. Thus, while the dynamics around 
IBAs may share features with those surrounding other types of commercial contracts, the substance of 
what is being traded here is crucial. As Affolder (2017) demonstrates in another context, the legal form 
may resemble a commercial contract, but the “subject-matter implicates issues that commercial contract 
law cannot resolve” (221): rights to land, inherent jurisdiction, sovereignty, the authority to decide. 
Norms are shifted through struggle. How can this regime be transformed?  Because IBAs are confidential 
and their contents closely guarded, even considered ‘proprietary’ by the firms that negotiate them 
(O’Faircheillaigh, 2016), it is not possible to easily advocate to turn the agreements into public policy 
instruments applicable more broadly throughout a region, although the case has been made that this is 
required (McLean, 2019). It is true that it is not only the companies that want confidentiality, First 
Nations are said to seek and value the confidentiality clauses as well – mostly out of concern about state 
clawback of what is called “own-source-revenue”, again drawing into the picture the larger structural 
conditions of settler colonial capitalism. But the secrecy leads to distrust and “toxicity within the 
communities”, according to one interviewee, while the benefits of confidentiality largely adhere to 
companies. The lack of transparency also prevents comparison between the magnitude of funds paid to 
First Nations versus the amounts received in state subsidies to the extractive industry, another area that 
could benefit from less secrecy. 
While it may be true that, as Gilmour and Mellett (2013) argue, “the regulator cannot offer to a First 
Nation the kinds of benefits that can be achieved in an IBA”, neither can the regulatory process, as it is 
currently structured under settler law, provide an avenue for a First Nation to offer a definitive ‘no’ to a 
project that the community does not ultimately consent to. That is, the contractual regime offers no path 
towards self-determination in terms of territorial governing authority or proprietary rights to lands and 
resources.  Indigenous peoples need space to envision and pursue development that “responds to the depth 
of Indigenous territorial responsibilities” (McCreary and Turner, 2018: 26) 
Consent by contract is a regime that erodes, over time, the territorial rights and sovereignty of Indigenous 
peoples, and IBAs in particular contribute to the undermining of resistance, criminalization of protest and 
division within and between Indigenous communities (Veltmeyer and Bowles 2014).  Without recourse to 
this weak justification that IndigeFnous peoples are participating, benefitting or ‘sharing in the wealth that 
comes from their territories’, we would much quicker demand the breakdown of the entire edifice. But as 
Cutler argues, the mix of public versus private authorities in complex governance questions is “not fixed, 
but mutable, and open in places to resistance” (2018: 16). While the contractual regime may, for now, be 
insulating the state from more radical and fundamental challenges to its territorial authority because IBAs 
provide a thin cover of consent for the contested projects, this is also vulnerable to changing norms and 
practices. 
Conclusions 
I have argued here, drawing on Cutler and Dietz’s (2019) framing in the context of private transnational 
governance, that ‘consent by contract’ is a mode of governance that attempts to define the social, 
political, ecological and economic relations regarding the use of Indigenous lands solely through 
confidential bargaining and agreement-making between private extraction companies and First Nations, 
but in fact affords the state a key role in setting the terms. But ‘consent’ must require something more 
than this. As Szablowski says, “consent processes are clearly political events that mobilize affected 
community members in a collective experience of active decision making about the future. They take 
place in public spaces. As a result, they are more likely to galvanize attention, and generate discussion 
and deliberation within a group” (2010: 119). What Indigenous peoples are seeking is not a better 
contractual regime; it is “a new constitutional order” (Szablowski 2010: 114).   
Scholars have begun to explore whether the ‘triumphant rise of contract’ (Zumbansen 2018:1) can be 
harnessed for creative, transformational change or what some of them term “radical transactionalism” 
(Morgan and Kuch, 2015; Crowder, 2016). Odumosu-Ayanu (2014) has proposed a move to tripartite 
contractual agreements, or “multi-actor contracts”, between investors (mining companies), local 
communities and ‘host states’ as a way of addressing many of the dilemmas explored here. Gaathi and 
Odumosu-Ayanu (2015) argue that new contractual regimes demonstrate “real potential to address or 
mitigate the absence of remedial and responsibility regimes for the adverse impacts of extractive industry 
activities on individuals and communities” (69).  While reforms such as these could certainly mitigate 
some of the worst aspects of the contractual turn, specifically the lack of remedies for affected “non-
parties”, this analysis has shown that it is in fact the public law regime -- the settler law and jurisprudence 
-- that presents the biggest barriers to restoring Indigenous control of lands. 
Contract law itself changes slowly, through a dynamic process of mutual adjustment of expectations.  The 
public law framework, it is hoped, could change quicker. Some scholars believe that the settler courts 
may (and must) provide openings and new interpretations that could shift the balance of power (see for 
example, Kamphuis, 2017). Others believe political tides may be shifting in favour of Indigenous peoples, 
which could usher in a new legislative framework for extraction. But in Canada, these hopes have been 
repeatedly dashed. This is because, as Julie Tomiak has argued, the settler state “is no less committed to 
the elimination and displacement of Indigenous peoples and sovereignty than more overtly genocidal 
colonial state practices of the past”, but simply employs new strategies, a central one of which is “an 
increased reliance on…contractual relations” (2016: 222). 
The settler state continues to be heavily invested in the profitability of the extractive sector. And yet, it is 
clear that the environmental and social costs of extractivism for the communities and territories in 
question far exceed the benefits that can be gained through extraction contracting. Further, since the ‘new 
extractive frontiers’ are frequently areas of high biodiversity and support a variety of critical ecological 
functions (Gedicks 2015), there are broader, diffuse costs borne by a wide range of interests – effects on 
water and air quality, climate instability, biodiversity loss, fragmentation of intact ecosystems, amongst 
others, that are completely uncompensated. Meanwhile the ‘benefits’ from the extraction are highly 
concentrated - -they accrue to a small number of companies and their investors-- even governments do not 
derive much in the way of revenues from mining (Veltmeyer and Bowles, 2014), especially for remote 
mines (Kuyek, 2019).   
As Edward Cohen (2019) contends, contractual regimes are “centers of contestation over the boundaries 
between public and private power and authority”; they constitute “crucial arenas in which patterns of 
power and purpose are constructed”. But as I have argued here, while the contractual form, construed as a 
matter of private law, is a critical “vector of power” (Cutler and Dietz, 2019), the settler state must be 
considered a party to the deal-making.  Consent by contract is a technique of the contemporary settler 
state to normalize its own tenuous authority over lands and resources in the face of increasingly 
convincing counter-claims.  There are always spaces for resistance, however, and the contractual regime 
with its bare veneer of ‘consent’, is coming under increasing pressure from Indigenous land defenders: 
“the perpetual threat of Indigenous nations is that they are a reminder of the settler’s own precarious 
claims to land and belonging” (Estes, 2018: 248). 
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